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T
echnological change has led to a dramatic decline in the cost of communication 
and in the cost of coordinating activities performed in different locations. This 
has allowed firms in rich countries to fragment their production process and offshore 
an increasing share of the value chain to low-wage countries.
1, 
2 Richard Baldwin 
(2006) refers to this phenomenon as the “second unbundling.” In his words, 
“rapidly falling transportation costs caused the first unbundling, namely 
the end of the necessity of making goods close to the point of consump-
tion. More recently, rapidly falling communication and coordination costs 
have fostered a second unbundling—the end of the need to perform most 
manufacturing stages near each other. Even more recently, the second 
unbundling has spread from factories to offices with the result being the 
offshoring of service-sector jobs.” (Baldwin 2006, 7    ).
The purpose of this paper is to explore the welfare consequences of this phemone-
non. There has been much discussion recently about this with a specific focus on 
the impact of offshoring on rich countries. Two popular approaches can be clearly 
1 Ronald W. Jones and Henryk Kierzkowski (1990) proposed this way of thinking about technological change, 
fragmentation, and international trade. Kei-Mu Yi (2003) develops a Ricardian model of trade to show that trade 
liberalization may also lead to increased fragmentation (or what he calls vertical specialization) and trade.
2 See Alan S. Blinder (2006), Gregory N. Mankiw and Phillip Swagel (2006), Gene M. Grossman and Esteban 
Rossi-Hansberg (2006), for an analysis of the US data showing that offshoring has grown dramatically over the 
last years.
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Offshoring in a Ricardian World 
†
By Andrés Rodríguez-Clare*
This paper proposes a Ricardian model to understand the short-run 
and long-run aggregate effects of increased fragmentation and off-
shoring on rich and poor countries. The short-run analysis shows 
that, when offshoring is sufficiently high, further increases in off-
shoring benefit the poor country and hurt the rich country. But these 
effects may be reversed in the long run as countries adjust their 
research efforts in response to increased offshoring. In particular, in 
the long run, the rich country always gains from increased offshor-
ing, whereas poor countries see their static gains partially eroded by 
a decline in their research efforts. (JEL F12, F23, L24, M16)
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distinguished. They both start from the notion that the unbundling of the production 
process entails an expansion of the set of tradeable goods and services, but go on to 
explore different implications. The first approach starts from the premise that trade 
entails gains for all parties involved, and then concludes that fragmentation and off-
shoring should be good for all countries. As Mankiw argued during a press confer-
ence in 2004: “More things are tradable than were tradable in the past, and that’s a 
good thing” (Mankiw and Swagel 2006, 9). In contrast, the second approach reasons 
that increased fragmentation possibilities and lower trade costs in the limit would 
allow the world to reach an “integrated equilibrium” in which wages for identical 
workers in different countries would necessarily be equalized. In other words, wages 
would no longer be affected by the location of workers. For example, in their recent 
book on offshoring, Ron Hira and Anil Hira (2005) argue that offshoring affects 
American workers by undermining their “primary competitive advantage over for-
eign workers: their physical presence in the US.” Other noneconomists writing about 
offshoring have expressed similar concerns.
3
A simple “toy” model may be useful to understand these two approaches to off-
shoring. First, consider a two-country model with labor as the only factor of pro-
duction, and one final good. For concreteness, let us think of the two countries as 
the United States (US) and the rest of the world (RW), and assume that the US has 
higher productivity, which entails higher wages. The existence of a single tradable 
good implies that there is no trade. But assume that fragmentation becomes feasible, 
so that some labor services can now be unbundled from the production of the final 
good. If the productivity in these labor services is the same across the two countries, 
then trade arises, with the US specializing in the production of the final good in 
exchange for labor services imported from the RW via offshoring operations. It is 
clear that both countries gain from the new trade made possible by fragmentation, 
just as in the first of the two approaches discussed above.
Imagine now that there are two final goods that can be traded at no cost between 
the US and the RW. Further assume that the US has a higher productivity in good 
1, while productivities are the same in good 2. If the US is not too large relative to 
the world’s demand for good 1, then it will specialize completely in that good and 
enjoy gains from trade that allow it to sustain higher wages than in the RW. As frag-
mentation becomes possible, US firms will engage in offshoring to use labor in the 
RW for part of their production process in good 1. This will effectively enlarge the 
US supply of good 1, which will worsen its terms of trade (hereafter TOT). If this 
process is sufficiently strong, the international relative price of good 1 will converge 
to the US opportunity cost of this good, at which point the US will no longer benefit 
from trade, and its wage level will become equal to that in the RW.
4 This captures 
the concerns of the second approach to offshoring mentioned earlier.
Each of these examples highlights an important aspect of the offshoring phe-
nomenon. Fragmentation leads to new trade and to an expansion in the supply of the 
good in which the advanced country has a comparative advantage. From the point 
3 See Paul Craig Roberts (2004) and Thomas L. Friedman (2005).
4 This effect of fragmentation and offshoring on the rich country is discussed in Alan V. Deardorff (2001) and 
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of view of the advanced country, the first effect is positive, while the second effect 
is negative. What is the net effect? To answer this question, one needs to consider a 
general trade model that is able to capture the roles played by both absolute and com-
parative advantage. The presence of an overall absolute advantage in the advanced 
country is a key element, as this is what leads to the wage gap that generates incen-
tives for offshoring. Comparative advantage is also clearly necessary, as this is what 
gives rise to trade in the absence of fragmentation, which is required for the negative 
TOT effect to arise. A general yet parsimonious model in which both absolute and 
comparative advantage play a role in determining wages and the gains from trade 
is Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum’s (2002) model of Ricardian trade. In this 
paper, I start out with this model, and then allow for fragmentation and offshoring to 
explore their impact on wages in advanced and poor countries.
5
Eaton and Kortum model sector-level productivities as being drawn from a dis-
tribution that is common across countries except for a technology parameter T. 
This technology parameter determines the location of the productivity distribution. 
Countries with a higher T have “better” distributions in the sense of first-order sto-
chastic dominance. Apart from T, countries also differ in L, the size of their labor 
force (which is the only factor of production). Assuming away trading costs for sim-
plicity, wages are determined by the ratio of technology to size, T/L. A high T/L 
means that the country would have many sectors in which it has absolute advantage 
relative to its size, leading to a high equilibrium wage. It is interesting to note that, 
given a fixed technology level, an increase in a country’s labor force—caused, per-
haps, by immigration—would lead to a decline in T/L, and hence a decline in the 
country’s wage. This is nothing but the classic effect of size on a country’s TOT in 
a Ricardian model.
6
Fragmentation is introduced into the model by assuming that production involves 
the combination of a continuum of labor services, a share of which may be offshored 
at no cost and with no loss of productivity.
7 Thus, fragmentation leads firms in high-
wage countries (i.e., countries with a high T/L) to offshore a part of their production 
process to low-wage countries. This represents new trade, where high T/L countries 
export final goods in exchange for imports of labor services through offshoring.
This model provides a simple way to study the impact of fragmentation and off-
shoring on wages in both rich and poor countries. Both effects mentioned above 
are present. There are gains from the new trade that takes place, as well as a move-
ment toward wage equalization that harms the rich countries and benefits the poor 
countries. The first is a productivity effect. It captures the idea that firms experience 
a decline in their unit costs as they offshore part of their production to low-wage 
5 I focus entirely on the impact of offshoring on average wages rather than on the wage distribution or skill 
premia. In other words, I am interested in understanding the conditions under which the winners from offshoring 
can compensate the losers, but do not consider the differential impacts on workers with different skill levels or in 
different activities or industries. Readers interested in this issue can consult Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. 
Hanson (1996, 1999), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Deardorff (2004), James Markusen (2005), Blinder (2006), 
and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, 2008), among others.
6 See Don R. Davis and David E. Weinstein (2002) for a recent discussion of the economic impact of immigra-
tion in the United States using this basic idea.
7 The modelling of offshoring as trade in a continuum of labor services is similar to the approach in Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), see below.230  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
countries. The second is a terms of trade effect. Finally, this analysis also reveals the 
existence of a world-efficiency effect, often neglected in discussions of offshoring, 
which entails a decline in world prices as labor is effectively reallocated from coun-
tries with low to countries with high T/L ratios.
From the point of view of poor countries, only the TOT and world efficiency 
effects are present, and both are positive, so these countries always benefit from 
fragmentation. But rich countries have to deal with the negative TOT effect. The 
analysis reveals that there is always a point beyond which increased fragmentation 
leads to a negative effect on the real wage in the rich country. In other words, when 
fragmentation is already high, a further increase in fragmentation generates a nega-
tive TOT effect that dominates the productivity and world-efficiency effects.
8 More 
specifically, if the technology gap between rich and poor countries is not too low, 
then the real wage in rich countries as a function of the level of fragmentation is 
shaped like an inverted u. Initially fragmentation leads to a higher real wage, but 
this is eventually reversed as fragmentation becomes sufficiently high. In the limit, 
as we approach a world with complete fragmentation and wage equalization, the 
real wage in the rich country must necessarily be lower than it would be under no 
fragmentation.
The result that in rich countries the positive productivity effect of offshoring can 
be dominated by a negative TOT effect, is reminiscent of the possibility of “immis-
erizing growth” for large countries analyzed by Bhagwati (1958). This suggests that 
in the presence of an optimal tariff or export tax, increased fragmentation would 
always improve welfare in the rich country. I show that this is indeed the case (at 
least for a “small economy” for which this can be done analytically).
The discussion of fragmentation and wages so far takes technology levels as exog-
enous, and can be interpreted as a short-run analysis. But, in the long run, technology 
levels are endogenous, determined by research efforts and research productivity. It 
is conceivable that the resources released by offshoring in the rich countries lead to 
an increased allocation of resources to research. This would tend to increase the T/L 
ratio and provides a new positive effect on wages not present in the static analysis.
To explore this possibility, I consider a dynamic model in which technology levels 
are endogenous, as in Eaton and Kortum (2001). In this dynamic model, workers 
choose to work in the production sector or to do research, which leads to new ideas 
or technologies. When the technology discovered is superior to the state of the art, 
its owner (or patent holder) earns quasi-rents that provide a return on the opportunity 
cost of research. The technology parameter T can now be interpreted as the “stock of 
ideas” in a country, and richer countries are the ones that have a higher stock of ideas 
per worker. Without fragmentation, the fraction of workers devoted to research turns 
out to be the same across countries, but countries with a higher research productiv-
ity (i.e., a higher rate of arrival of ideas per researcher) can sustain a higher T/L, 
and hence higher wages in steady state. Fragmentation generates the same short-run 
effects as above, but now we must also take into account the impact on the allocation 
8 Although clearly related, this is not a simple application of the immiserizing growth possibility studied by 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1958). In fact, as discussed in footnote 13, although higher efficiency in the Eaton and Kortum 
(2002) model leads to declining terms of trade, this would never dominate the direct benefits.VoL. 2 no. 2  231 RodRíguEz-cLARE: offshoRIng In A RIcARdIAn WoRLd
of workers between production and research in both the rich and poor countries. It 
will be shown that fragmentation and offshoring induce more people in rich coun-
tries to work as researchers, which in the long run increases T/L and wages, coun-
teracting the negative effects mentioned above. In fact, the analysis reveals that in 
steady state this research effect weakens the TOT effect to such an extent that it is 
now always dominated by the productivity effect. The result is that, in the long run, 
wages in rich countries always increase with fragmentation.
The long-run effects of fragmentation turn out to be quite different in poor coun-
tries. There, as people start to work as providers of labor services through offshor-
ing operations, the fraction of people devoted to research falls, decreasing T/L and 
wages. This entails a negative research effect that in steady state exactly compen-
sates the positive TOT effect. Thus, just like every other country (even the ones that 
do not participate in offshoring activities), poor countries benefit from fragmentation 
only through the world-efficiency effect.
In sum, the analysis suggests that increased fragmentation could have negative 
effects for rich countries, but that these effects dissipate in time, so that the long run 
effects are always positive for the countries doing the offshoring. In contrast, the 
long-run effects of fragmentation in poor countries are weaker than the correspond-
ing short-run effects. For the rich country, the presence of opposite short- and long-
run effects implies that increased fragmentation could be harmful or beneficial. For 
a special case that can be analytically solved, I show that as long as the speed with 
which resources can be reallocated across production and research is sufficiently 
high, then the long-run effects dominate, and the rich country gains from offshoring.
In thinking about the connection between innovation and offshoring, I follow 
a long tradition in the literature by focusing on the implications of trade for the 
allocation of resources to innovation (see Grossman and Elhanan Helpman 1991). 
This leaves out some possibly relevant channels. First, as shown by Alireza Naghavi 
and Gianmarco Ottaviano (2009), offshoring can decrease research effectiveness 
and growth in the north by weakening the information feedback from production to 
R&D.
9 In contrast, offshoring can lead to knowledge spillovers that benefit the poor 
country. Second, innovation could be directed at expanding the range of tasks that 
can be offshored. If such innovation is carried out by the poor country (e.g., India 
develops technology that allows it to provide IT support to companies in the US), 
then that country would benefit more than is implied by the model developed here, 
where the range of tasks that can be offshored is taken to increase exogenously. 
Finally, innovation can be seen as a set of activities that are also amenable to off-
shoring. In fact, some authors have noted, with some concern, that this is already 
taking place in the US (Dieter Ernst 2006, and Jeffrey T. Macher and David C. 
Mowery 2008). A limitation of the present model is that this type of offshoring does 
not take place since the north does not want to offshore research to the south. In the 
conclusion, I briefly touch on some of these issues, but a full exploration is left for 
future research.
9 Brian J. Fifarek, Francisco M. Veloso, and Cliff I. Davidson (2008) argue that this negative effect of offshor-
ing on innovation has already taken place in the rare earth element industry in the United States.232  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
There is a long list of recent papers that have analyzed the possible effects of frag-
mentation and offshoring on wages in rich countries.
10 Paul A. Samuelson (2004) 
stressed the possible negative impact of offshoring if it leads to spillovers that erode 
the rich countries’ technological advantage in exporting sectors, while Deardorff 
(2001, 2005) showed that, even without such spillovers, rich countries would suf-
fer a deterioration of their TOT that could more than compensate any associated 
gains. Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya, and T. N. Srinivasan (2004) and Mankiw and 
Swagel (2006) argued that the negative TOT effect would likely be dominated by 
the positive productivity effect. The present paper shows that in the short run this 
is not necessarily the case. In fact, when fragmentation is sufficiently high, further 
increases in fragmentation (and offshoring) necessarily hurt the rich country. But, 
again, this applies only in the short run. In the long run, when research efforts have 
had time to fully adjust to the new environment, rich countries are always better off 
with offshoring than without.
Another group of papers have explored the implications of fragmentation on wages 
for skilled and unskilled workers in the context of a Hecksher-Ohlin model of trade.
11 
Prominent examples are Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), 
Deardorff (2004), Kohler (2004), Markusen (2005), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006, 2008), and Baldwin and Frédéric Robert-Nicoud (2007). The contribution 
of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008); or GRH, is particularly relevant to the 
present paper. In their main specification, fragmentation is seen as the decline in 
the cost of trading a continuum of unskilled tasks. Focusing on a skilled-labor abun-
dant country, GRH show that fragmentation leads to increased offshoring of such 
tasks, a positive productivity effect that increases the wage of unskilled workers, 
and an improvement in the TOT that has the usual Stolper-Samuelson implications. 
In another specification, GRH explore the consequences of an overall decline in the 
costs of offshoring all tasks (skilled and unskilled). GRH note that this generates a 
positive productivity effect, but a deterioration of the country’s TOT. Offshoring also 
has these conflicting effects on the rich country in the Ricardian model presented 
below, but the model has the advantage that these two effects can be compared in 
such a way that the net result can be fully characterized both in the short run and in 
the long run.
The connection between offshoring and innovation has received scant attention 
in the literature. Two exceptions are Amy Jocelyn Glass and Kamal Saggi (2001) 
and Naghavi and Ottaviano (2009). Glass and Saggi (2001) extend Grossman and 
Helpman’s (1991) quality-ladder growth model to a two-country setting with offshor-
ing. Focusing on the steady state, they show that a decline in the cost of offshoring 
leads to an increase in innovation in the rich country and an increase in the growth 
rate. However, in their model, the increase in innovation must be accompanied by 
10 For recent surveys see Mankiw and Swagel (2006) and Baldwin (2006). See also Martin Neil Baily and 
Robert Z. Lawrence (2004) for an exploration of the implications of offshoring for the loss of manufacturing jobs 
in the US over the last decades. For an analysis of the effect of offshoring on unemployment see Devashish Mitra 
and Priya Ranjan (2009).
11 Another approach is Willhelm Kohler (2004), who explores the consequences of offshoring in a specific-
factors model of a small-open economy, and shows conditions under which the presence of nonconvexities may 
lead offshoring to harm the rich country.VoL. 2 no. 2  233 RodRíguEz-cLARE: offshoRIng In A RIcARdIAn WoRLd
a decline in the rich country’s wage to keep innovation profitable. In contrast, I 
build on the quasi-endogenous growth framework of Kortum (1997) and Eaton and 
Kortum (2001), so offshoring has no growth effects, and the steady state effect on 
the rich country’s wage is positive thanks to the direct productivity effect and the 
long-run effect of increased research on the rich country’s technology distribution.
Finally,  Robert-Nicoud  (2008)  explores  the  effect  of  offshoring  in  a  New 
Economic Geography model a la Paul R. Krugman and Anthony J. Venables (1995), 
where “manufacturing” is subject to economies of agglomeration, while agricul-
ture is produced with aggregate constant returns to scale. Robert-Nicoud shows that 
fragmentation and offshoring enlarges the set of parameters for which there is an 
equilibrum with manufacturing concentrated in the north. The conclusion is that 
offshoring helps the north to counteract the deindustrialization forces unleashed by 
a decline in the cost of trading manufacturing goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the static model 
and derives the implications of fragmentation on both rich and poor countries partic-
ipating in offshoring activities. Section II presents a dynamic model where technol-
ogy levels are endogenously determined by research efforts in each country. In the 
short run, this model is equivalent to the static model of Section I. I use this model to 
explore the implications of fragmentation on long-run (steady-state) research inten-
sities and wages in the rich and poor countries participating in offshoring. I also 
study the transition dynamics to understand the net welfare effects of an unexpected 
increase in fragmentation. Section III compares the implications of offshoring to 
immigration, and Section IV presents an extension of the model. Section V con-
cludes. All proofs are relegated to a Web Appendix.
I.  The Static Model
The static model builds on the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of Ricardian 
trade under the simplifying assumption of no transportation costs. There are n coun-
tries, indexed by i ∈ {1,2, …  , n }, and a continuum of tradable final goods, indexed 
by j ∈ [0, 1]. Labor is the only factor of production, and is supplied inelastically at 
quantity measure Li in country i. Preferences across goods are Cobb-Douglas and 
symmetric, so that an equal share of income is spent on each good j.
All final goods are produced from a single “common input” for which the cost 
in country i is denoted by ci. In a standard Ricardian model, the common input 
is labor, so ci is simply the wage wi. Here, I allow for a more general production 
structure to introduce fragmentation and offshoring into the model, so ci may dif-
fer from wi. In particular, I assume that the common input is produced through a 
Leontief production function from a continuum of intermediate services indexed 
by k ∈ [0, 1]. Formally, letting x  (k) represent the quantity of intermediate service 
k, then output of the common input is X  =  mink {x  (k)}. In turn, x (k) is produced 
one-to-one from labor. If all intermediate services must be produced directly by the 
firm, then this collapses to the standard case with ci  =  wi. Fragmentation is intro-
duced by allowing firms to costlessly offshore at most a certain exogenous share 
β ∈ [0, 1[ of the intermediate services. The assumption that β is exogenous simpli-
fies the analysis considerably, but is not essential. As I show in Section IV, the main 234  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
results go through in a setting where the measure of services that are offshored is 
endogenous to the costs of trading services as in Kohler (2004) and Grossman and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Below, I refer to the restriction that firms cannot offshore 
more than a share β of services as the “offshoring restriction.”
To simplify the analysis and exposition, I focus on the possibility of offshoring 
by country 1 from country 2 (country 1 is the rich country), while offshoring is not 
possible for all the other countries. In Section IV, I extend the analysis to allow 
for offshoring between three countries. Except for that, all of the main results of 
the paper could be derived in a setting with only two countries, but I consider n 
countries because this does not entail any complications (it actually makes the 
presentation simpler), and because this will be needed for some extensions that I 
discuss below.
If w1 > w2, then firms in country 1 would want to exploit all opportunities for 
offshoring, and hence the unit cost of the common input there would be
(1)    c1  =  (1  −  β)  w1  +  β  w2 .
More  generally,  we  have  c1  =  min {w1, (1 − β)  w1 + β  w2  },  while  ci  =  wi  for 
i  ≠  1.
The common input is converted into final goods through the use of linear technol-
ogies that vary in productivity across goods and countries. Letting zi(    j    ) denote the 
productivity for good j in country i, then country i’s unit cost for j is ci  /zi(    j    ). These 
linear technologies are available to all firms within a country, so the appropriate 
market structure is perfect competition. Given the absence of transportation costs, 
then the price of good j in all countries is simply mini {ci  /zi (    j    )}.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the productivities zi (    j    ) are modelled as the real-
ization of a random variable that is assumed to be independent across goods and 
countries. In particular, in country i, the productivity zi for each good j ∈ [0, 1] is 
drawn from the Fréchet distribution,
(2)    fi (z)  =  Pr [zi  ≤  z  ]  =  exp[−  Ti z
−θ   ],
where Ti > 0 and θ > 1. The parameter Ti can vary across countries and determines 
the location of the distribution. A higher Ti implies that the productivity draws are 
likely to be better. Thus, Ti is country i’s technology level and determines the share 
of goods in which it has absolute advantage relative to other countries across the con-
tinuum of goods. The parameter θ (which is common across countries) determines 
the variability of the draws, and hence the strength of comparative advantage. A 
lower θ implies a stronger comparative advantage.
A. Equilibrium with no offshoring
To establish a benchmark, introduce some notation and develop some initial intu-
ition for the results to come, consider first the case with no offshoring, or β = 0. The 
unit cost of the common input in country i is then simply wi (i.e., ci = wi for all i).VoL. 2 no. 2  235 RodRíguEz-cLARE: offshoRIng In A RIcARdIAn WoRLd
Given the preferences previously specified, the share of total income that each 
country spends on imports from country i is equal to the share of goods for which 
country i is the least-cost producer. In turn, this is equal to πi  =  Ti   w  i   
−θ  /Φ, where 
Φ ≡   ∑  k   
 
       Tk   w  k   
−θ  .
12 Note that, given wi , a higher Ti implies more exports, and the 
same happens with a lower wi given Ti.
Wages are determined by the trade-balance conditions, which, in this context of 
no trade costs, are simply given by
(3)    πiY  =  wi Li,
where Y  ≡  ∑k wk Lk is worldwide income. Using country n’s labor as numeraire 
(i.e., wn  =  1), it is easy to show that
(4)    wi  =  δ(Ti /Li )
κ,
where δ  ≡  (Tn/Ln)
−κ and κ  ≡  1/(1 + θ). Note that an increase in size Li, holding 
the technology level Ti constant, implies a decline in country i’s wage. This hap-
pens through a deterioration of country i’s TOT and is the channel through which 
increased fragmentation and offshoring could lower country 1’s income level.
13
B. Equilibrium with offshoring
Consider now the case in which offshoring is feasible (β > 0). The cost of the 
common input in country 1 will differ from the wage there because of the pos-
sibility of indirectly using labor at the cheaper cost w2 in country 2. In particular, 
if w1 > w2, then the offshoring restriction will be binding, and c1 will be given by 
(1). Moreover, since a share 1 − β of the total quantity of the common input is pro-
duced domestically, then the full employment condition in country 1 entails (1 − β)
X = L1. The total amount of labor used in country 2 via offshoring, βX, is then equal 
to αL1, where α  ≡  β/(1 − β). (Even though α and β capture the same thing, in the 
rest of the paper I will use both of these parameters, at each point choosing the one 
that helps to convey the results more clearly.) Since all countries other than 1 do not 
engage in offshoring, ci  =  wi for all i  ≠  1. The import shares in equilibrium are 
now
(5)    πi  =  Ti   c  i   
−θ  /Φ
12 To see this, note that the distribution of the price that country i would charge for a particular good, 
pi = wi/z  , is Pri (pi ≤ p)  =  Pri (z ≥ wi/p)  =  gi( p)  ≡  1 −   e   
−  T  i    (wi/p)   
−θ    . In turn, the distribution of the minimum 
price across countries i ∈ Γ, p(Γ)  ≡  min i∈Γ { pi}, is gΓ( p)  =  1 −   ∏  i∈Γ             Pri ( pi ≥ p)  =  1 −   e   
−Φ(Γ)  p   
θ    , where Φ(Γ) 
≡  ∑i∈Γ Ti  w  i   
−θ  . Hence, letting Γ(−i  ) be the set of countries other than i, the probability that country i has the low-
est cost is πi  =    ∫0   
∞
      gΓ(−i)( p) dgi( p)  =  Ti   w  i   
−θ  /Φ.
13 Note, however, that growth cannot be immiserizing in this case. Consider an increase in productivity that is 
manifested as an increase in “efficiency units” per person (an increase in T would always lead to a higher wage). 
Total efficiency units are now L  =  en, with e being efficiency units per person, and n being the level of popula-
tion (or labor force). The wage is now δe(T/en)
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for all i. The trade balance conditions are unchanged for i  ≠  1, 2, whereas for coun-
tries 1 and 2, they are now given by
(6)    π1 Y  =  w1 L1  +  αw2 L1
and
(7)    π2 Y  =  w2 L  2  −  αw2 L1.
The term αw2L1 is simply the value of intermediate services imported by country 1 
from country 2.
Combining (5), for i = 2, with (7) yields
(8)    w2  =  δ  (T2 /   ˜   
  L   2  )
κ,
where
(9)       ˜   
  L   2  ≡  L  2  −  αL1
is the number of workers left in country 2 for production given that αL1 workers 
are devoted to offshoring services for country 1. Comparing (4) and (8) shows that 
country 2’s wage is increased by offshoring, i.e., w′2(α) > 0. The reason for this is 
that a decline in the number of workers left for production, given a fixed technology 
level, increases the ratio T2  /   ˜   
  L   2, and thereby improves country 2’s TOT. As intuition 
would suggest, the effect of offshoring on w2 is exactly the same as the effect of a 
reduction in L  2 due to outmigration in country 2.
Turning to country 1, combining equations (5), for i = 1, with (6) implies that
(10)    (1  −  β)w1  +  βw2  =  δ(T1  /   ˜   
  L   1  )
κ,
where
(11)       ˜   
  L   1  ≡  (1  +  α)L1
is the “effective” amount of labor devoted to production in country 1, once we take 
into account the extra labor used through offshoring. Equation (10) shows that, given 
w2, offshoring has two opposite effects on the wage in country 1. First, there is 
an increase in the effective number of workers in production (i.e.,    ˜   
  L   1 > L1  ), which 
worsens its TOT. Second, there is a decline in costs thanks to the use of cheaper 
labor in country 2 through offshoring (i.e., w2 < w1  ). Below I refer to these two 
effects as the terms of trade effect and the productivity effect. The net impact of 
these two effects on the equilibrium wage in country 1 is explored below. For now, 
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Equations (8) through (11) determine the equilibrium wages in countries 1 and 
2 if two constraints are satisfied. First, there is a resource constraint in country 2, 
which implies that αL1 ≤ L  2. Second, wages satisfy w1 > w2. This is equivalent to 
T1  /   ˜   
  L   1 > T2  /   ˜   
  L   2. Letting η  ≡  (T1  /L1  )/(T2  /L  2  ), then this inequality can be written as
(12)    η(1 − αL1/L  2) > 1 + α.
From now on, I will assume that η > 1. This is simply a condition that with no 
offshoring we have w1 > w2. Given η > 1, then the inequality in (12) is satisfied for 
α = 0. As α increases the LHS falls, whereas the RHS increases, and there is a level 
of α such that the two sides become equal, namely
     
__
  α     ≡    
η − 1
  _________ 
1 + ηL1/L  2
    .
Thus, the inequality in (12) is satisfied if and only if α <  
__
  α    . If this inequality is satis-
fied, then it is easy to check that the resource constraint in country 2 (i.e., αL1 ≤ L  2  ) 
is also satisfied. Thus, if α <  
__
  α    , the equilibrium is characterized by the solution of 
equations (8) through (10).
What is the equilibrium if α ≥  
__
  α      ? In this case the equilibrium entails w1 = w2, 
the offshoring restriction is not binding, and the equilibrium is characterized by the 
equations (8)–(10), but with  
__
  α     rather than α. It is important to note that if α ≥  
__
  α    , 
then offshoring allows economies 1 and 2 to reach an integrated equilibrium, so fac-
tor price equalization (FPE) holds (i.e., w1 = w2). In the rest of the paper, I refer to 
this case as “full offshoring.”
C. Wages under full offshoring
Here, I compare the wage in country 1 under full offshoring with the level that 
prevails with no offshoring. In the subsections that follow, I turn to a more general 
comparative-statics analysis to understand the effect of fragmentation on wages in 
countries 1 and 2.
Since economies 1 and 2 are effectively integrated through offshoring, it is pos-
sible to consider them as if they were a single region in a world with no offshoring. 
To explore this further, I now use the index m to refer to the region composed of 
countries 1 and 2. This region has workforce Lm ≡ L1 + L  2, and for each good it will 
use the best among the two technologies available, hence, for each j, we have zm(   j  ) 
= max  {z1(   j  ), z2(   j  )}. It is easy to verify that this implies that zm(   j  ) is distributed 
Fréchet with parameters θ and Tm ≡ T1 + T2. The share of world income spent on 
imports from region m is given by
    πm =    
Tm  w  m   
−θ 
  _____  Φ    ,
where Φ = Tm  w  m   
−θ   + Φ−m, and Φ−m ≡   ∑  k≠1, 2  
 
       Tk  w  k   
−θ  . Total income in region m is 
wm Lm, and the trade balance condition for this region is now simply πmY = wm Lm.238  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
Just as in the case of no offshoring considered above, we now have
    wm  =  δ(Tm/Lm)
κ  .
The effect of full offshoring on the wage in country 1 can now be determined 
by comparing w1 under no offshoring with wm. It is easy to see that since η > 1, 
Tm/Lm < T1/L1, and wm < w1 |α=0. Intuitively, integration with country 2 through 
offshoring effectively lowers country 1’s technology level per worker (T/L), and this 
leads to a decline in its TOT.
This result concerns the effect of full offshoring on the wage in country 1 relative 
to the wage of the numeraire country. But it is also important to consider the impact 
on the real wage w1/p, where p is the price index of a unit of utility. It is straightfor-
ward to show that
(13)    p  =      ˜   
  γ   Φ
−1/θ,
where    ˜   
  γ   ≡ e
−γ/θ, and γ is Euler’s constant.
14 Since Φ =   ∑  k   
 
      Tk   c  k   
−θ  , this expression 
implies that higher technology levels or lower unit costs lead to lower prices. From this 
expression it is now easy to establish that p is lower under full offshoring than with no 
offshoring,
15 a result that reflects the higher efficiency attained when labor effectively 
reallocates from country 2 to country 1. There are then two opposite effects on the real 
wage in country 1 as we move from no offshoring to full offshoring: the TOT effect, 
which decreases the relative wage w1, and the world-efficiency effect, which lowers the 
price index p. Note that there is no productivity effect here because there is no longer a 
wage gap between countries 1 and 2. As a consequence, country 1 does not gain from 
trading services with country 2.
16 In other words, country 1’s cost savings from using 
cheaper labor in country 2 are dissipated as more and more offshoring is undertaken 
by country 1’s firms. This is similar to the result that a large economy gains nothing 
from trade when the international price becomes equal to its autarky price.
As shown in the Web Appendix, the TOT effect always dominates the world-
efficiency effect, so that w1/p is necessarily lower under full offshoring than with 
no offshoring. Recalling that the wage in country 2 increases with offshoring, this 
result leads to the following proposition.
14 To see this, note from footnote 12 that the distribution of the international price is gΓ( p) with Γ being the 
set of all countries, or g( p) = 1 −   e   
−Φ  p   
θ    . Therefore, p = exp   ∫0   
∞
   ln   ( p) dg( p) = e
−γ/θ Φ
−1/θ, where γ is Euler’s 
constant (i.e., γ ≡ −    ∫0   
∞
   ln   (x) e
−x dx). Readers familiar with Eaton and Kortum (2001) will note that this is slightly 
different from their result, namely p = γ  Φ
−1/θ. This difference is due to an inconsequential mistake in Eaton and 
Kortum (2001).
15 This just requires showing that Tm   w  m   
−θ   is higher than T1   w  1   
−θ   + T2   w  2   
−θ   for the wages w1 and w2 that prevail 
with no offshoring. But, using wi = δ (Ti/Li )
κ for i = 1, 2, m, then this follows from the concavity of the function 
f (x) = x 
κθ.
16 Note that w1 and w2 are different under full offshoring than with no offshoring, but this is captured by the 
terms-of-trade effect. The productivity effect relies on w2 being lower than w1 in a particular equilibrium (see 
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PROPOSITION 1: There is full offshoring if α ≥  
__
  α    . under full offshoring, w1 and 
w1/p are lower, and w2 and w2/p are higher than with no offshoring.
To understand why the TOT effect dominates the world-efficiency effect, note that 
the full offshoring equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium that results when Δ 
workers are reallocated from country 2 to country 1, where Δ is given implicitly by 
T1/(L1 + Δ) = Tm/Lm = T2/(L  2 − Δ). This can be verified simply by noting that, in this 
case, we would have w1 = w2 = wm , just as under full offshoring. This reallocation of 
workers from 2 to 1 can be seen as the combination of two steps. First, an increase in L1 
by Δ, and second, a decrease in L  2 by Δ. Standard Ricardian trade theory implies that 
both of these steps lead to a decline in the real wage in country 1. Hence, w1/p will be 
lower under full offshoring than with no offshoring (see also Davis and Weinstein 2002).
This result is derived for the case of frictionless trade in final goods. One con-
cern is that this may overemphasize the importance of the TOT loses arising from 
offshoring. For example, the presence of nontraded goods would imply that the pro-
ductivity gains from offshoring generate a weaker TOT deterioration. To explore 
this, imagine that a share ξ of final goods are nontradable. The price index would 
now  differ  across  countries,  and  would  be  pi =    ˜   
  γ    ((Ti   c  i   
−θ    )
ξ  Φ
1−ξ  )
−1/θ  in  coun-
try  i,  but  all  the  other  results  remain  unchanged.  In  particular,  relative  wages 
are  independent  of  ξ  and  full  offshoring  still  holds  for  α ≥  
__
  α    .  Letting    ω  1   
fo  (ξ) 
and   ω  1   
no  (ξ) be the real wage in country 1 as a function of ξ under full offshoring and 
no offshoring (i.e., β = 0), respectively, then it is easy to show that   ω  1   
fo  (ξ)/  ω  1   
no  (ξ) 
= [  ω  1   
fo  (0)/  ω  1   
no  (0)]
1−ξ. This implies that if   ω  1   
no  (0) >   ω  1   
fo  (0), as shown in Proposition 
1, then also   ω  1   
no  (ξ) >   ω  1   
fo  (ξ) for any ξ ∈ [0, 1]. This shows that the presence of non-
tradable goods does not change the result in Proposition 1. This is because the pres-
ence of nontradable goods weakens the TOT and world-efficiency effects by exactly 
the same proportion.
A related issue relates to the presence of transportation costs for final goods. To 
retain the possibility of full offshoring between countries 1 and 2, assume that there 
are no transportation costs between these two countries, but allow such costs for trade 
in final goods between them and the rest of the world. In particular, assume that there 
are uniform transportation costs between all country pairs except between countries 
1 and 2, among which there is frictionless trade. The equilibrium wage in these two 
countries is no longer given by wm = δ  (Tm/Lm  )
κ, but it is increasing in Tm/Lm . Since 
Tm/Lm < T1/L1, this immediately establishes that wm is lower than country 1’s relative 
wage under no offshoring, just as in Proposition 1. Turning to the real wage, note again 
that the move from no offshoring to full offshoring can be seen as the reallocation of 
Δ (as defined above) workers from country 2 to country 1, and this necessarily makes 
country 1 worse off.
D. The Effect of offshoring on Relative Wages
Above, it was already shown that the wage in country 2 increases with α (see (8) 
and (9)). I now explore how α affects w1. Solving for w1 from (10) yields
    w1  =  (1  +  α)   ˜   
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where    ˜   
  w  1 ≡ δ(T1/   ˜   
  L   1)
κ is the wage that would prevail in country 1 with no offshor-
ing if its labor supply was    ˜   
  L   1. In other words, this would be the equilibrium wage if 
offshoring only generated a TOT effect but no productivity effect. Note that both    ˜   
  w  1 
and w2 are affected by α. Differentiating with respect to α and simplifying yields
(14)    w′ 1  =  (1  +  α)   ˜   
  w  ′ 1  −  α w′ 2  +  (w1  −  w2  )/(1  +  α).
The  first  term  on  the  RHS  of  (14)  captures  the  TOT  effect.  It  is  negative 
because    ˜   
  w  ′ 1 = −  κ   ˜   
  w  1/(1 + α) < 0. Intuitively, as α increases the “effective” sup-
ply    ˜   
  L   1 increases and this leads to a decline in the wage through a worsening of coun-
try 1’s TOT. The second term is negative because, as shown above, w2 is increasing in 
α. This is simply a demand effect: as offshoring increases, this pushes up country 2’s 
wages, and this hurts country 1, which uses country 2’s labor as an input. This sec-
ond term could also be seen as part of a broader TOT effect that takes into account 
the price that country 1 must pay for imported services. Finally, the third term on 
the RHS of (14) is the productivity effect, which is positive as long as w1 > w2. This 
effect captures the idea that by having access to cheaper labor in country 2, country 
1 achieves a decline in its costs, and this leads to higher wages there.
To characterize the net marginal effect of offshoring on wages in country 1, i.e., 
w′ 1(α), it is useful to note the following two points. First, the productivity effect 
depends positively on the wage difference w1 − w2, which in turn is increasing in 
the ratio of per capita technology levels in country 1 relative to country 2, or η.
17 
Thus, w′ 1(α) is more likely to be positive if η is large. In particular, from (14) we get
    w′ 1(0)  =  w2(0)[(1  −  κ)η
κ  −  1].
Thus, w′ 1(0) ≷ 0 according to whether η ≷ (1 − κ)
−1/κ. Second, as α gets close to  
__
  α     
the wage difference w1 − w2 goes to zero and the productivity effect vanishes, so 
w′ 1(α) is necessarily negative for α close enough to  
__
  α    . These two points combined 
suggest that for η ≤ (1 − κ)
−1/κ, the curve w1(α) is always decreasing, whereas for 
η > (1 − κ)
−1/κ, this curve is shaped like an inverted u. The next Proposition estab-
lishes this result.
PROPOSITION 2: consider α in the interval [  0,  
__
  α     ]. Along this interval, the func-
tion  w1(α)  is  concave.  If  η ≤ (1 − κ)
−1/κ,  then  w1(α)  is  decreasing,  whereas  if 
η > (1 − κ)
−1/κ, then w1(α) is shaped like an inverted u.
E. The Effect of offshoring on Real Wages
To explore the effects of offshoring on real wages, we need to bring the world-
efficiency effect into the analysis. As one would expect, offshoring decreases the 
price index p. Intuitively, an increase in α effectively implies more possibilities to 
17 The result that the gains from offshoring are more likely to be positive when the wage gap is higher is also 
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trade, and this increases worldwide efficiency. The following proposition formalizes 
this result:
PROPOSITION 3: The price index p is decreasing in α ∈ [  0,  
__
  α      ].
Since  w2(α)  is  increasing,  then  clearly  w2(α)/p(α)  will  also  be  increasing. 
Similarly, if w1(α) is increasing, then w1(α)/p(α) will be increasing as well. But 
what happens when w1(α) is decreasing? The following Proposition shows that the 
characterization of w1(α)/p(α) is very similar to the characterization of w1(α) in 
Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 4: consider α in the interval [  0,  
__
  α      ]. There exists    ˆ     η  , such that if 
η ≤     ˆ     η  , then w1/p is decreasing in α, while if η >     ˆ     η  , then w1/p is shaped like an 
inverted u as a function of α.
This proposition shows that when fragmentation is sufficiently high, then further 
increases in fragmentation (and offshoring) necessarily hurt the rich country. This 
arises because the productivity and world-efficiency effects are dominated by the 
TOT and demand effects. A natural question here is whether an appropriate tariff or 
export tax could prevent such a negative impact. The working paper version of this 
paper explores this idea formally, focusing on the case of an export tax (the impact 
of a tariff would be equivalent). To derive analytical results, I consider the region 
composed of countries 1 and 2 as a “small economy,” in the Fernando Alvarez and 
Robert E. Lucas (2005) sense of the limit of a sequence in which the ratios ki = Ti/Li 
for i = 1, 2 and L  2/L1 remain constant, but L1 → 0. The results reveal that, under 
an appropriate export tax, an increase in fragmentation never makes the economy 
worse off. This is analogous to the well-known proposition that an optimal tariff 
or export tax rules out the possibility of immiserizing growth for a large economy 
(Bhagwati 1958).
II.  The Dynamic Model
The previous section analyzed the effects of offshoring in a static model in which 
technology levels are fixed. This section explores how these results are affected 
when technology levels are endogenous in a fully dynamic model. The “short run” 
of this dynamic model will be equivalent to the static model analyzed above.
Technological progress is modeled as in Eaton and Kortum (2001). People choose 
to do research or work in the productive sector. Recall that in the previous section, we 
used Li to denote the number of workers engaged in production (including producing 
intermediate services as part of offshoring operations for other countries). Letting   
L  it   
f   be the total labor force and Rit be the number of people working as researchers 
in country i at time t, then the full employment condition is Rit + Lit =   L  it   
f  . I assume 
that   L  it   
f   grows at a constant rate gL that is common across countries. Also, I assume 
that the reallocation of workers between production and research is sluggish. This 
implies that Lit will be a state variable, and hence fixed in the short run (as in the 
previous section and Section IIA). To simplify, I assume that people are born as 242  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
  producers or researchers in proportion to the current population, and then at each 
point in time people get a chance to switch sectors at a constant and exogenous prob-
ability υp(υR  ) for those in production (research). For future purposes, note that in 
steady state people will be happy to stay where they are born, so υp and υR will not 
be relevant for the steady state analysis in Section IIB. The size of υp and υR will 
affect the transition path after the economy is hit by a shock that changes the steady 
state allocation of people between research and production, as I consider in Section 
IIC.
A researcher in country i draws technologies or “ideas” at a Poisson rate ϕi. This 
parameter reflects research productivity and may vary across countries. Letting Tit 
be the total number of ideas that have been generated in country i up to time t, 
then    ˙   
  T   it = ϕi Rit and
(15)    Tit  =  ϕi ∫ 
0   
t
   Ris ds  .
Each idea has two characteristics: the good j ∈ [  0, 1 ] to which it applies, and its 
productivity q. Each of these characteristics is modeled as the realization of a ran-
dom variable. j is distributed uniformly over the interval [  0, 1 ], while q is distributed 
Pareto with parameter θ > 1. Formally, for q ≥ 1, it is assumed that
    h(q)  =  Pr [  q′  ≤  q ]  =  1  −  q
−θ.
Let zit  (    j  ) be the maximum q over ideas that apply to good j in country i at time 
t. It can be shown that the distribution of zit  (    j ) (which will be independent across 
goods and countries) has the Fréchet form, as in (2), with Tit given by (15).
18 In other 
words, the process for the arrival of ideas specified here leads to the Fréchet pro-
ductivity frontier postulated in the static model, with the parameter θ in the Fréchet 
distribution coming from the parameter θ in the Pareto distribution of the quality of 
ideas, and the parameter Ti growing over time and being equal to the stock of ideas 
in country i at time t.
Researchers sell their ideas to firms that engage in Bertrand competition with 
other firms in the worldwide market for consumer goods.
19 Consider the competi-
tion for a particular good. Only the firms holding the best idea for this good within 
some country have a chance of surviving the competition in the international mar-
ket. Thus, the country that captures the worldwide market for good j at time t is 
given by arg mini {ci/zit  (    j )}.
The firm that captures the worldwide market for a good will make positive quasi-
profits by charging a mark-up that depends on the second-least unit cost. Eaton and 
Kortum (2001) show that this mark-up is also distributed Pareto with parameter θ, 
18 To derive this result, note that the number of ideas k that have arrived for any good at time t is distributed 
Poisson with parameter Tit , so Pr (k′ = k) =   e   
−  T  it      T    it   
k    /k!. Hence, Pr (z  ′ it ≤ z) =   ∑  k=0  
∞
      (  e   
−  T  it      T  it   
k  /k!)h(z)
k, which given   
∑  k=0  
∞
    x
k/k!   = e
x implies Pr (z′  it ≤ z) = fit(z) = exp[−  Tit z
−θ ] for z ≥ 1. Note that since h(q) is defined for q ≥ 1, 
then this distribution is defined for z ≥ 1, whereas the distribution in (2) is defined for z ≥ 0. But, as discussed in 
footnote 9 of Eaton and Kortum (2001), this difference gets arbitrarily small as the T    s get large, so one can safely 
ignore this difference.
19 As in Eaton and Kortum (2001), I assume that ideas can only be used in the country in which they originate. 
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or m ∼ h(m).
20 This is the distribution for the mark-up charged by firms from any 
country, and is constant through time. Letting Yt denote worldwide income at time t, 
then (given the assumed preferences) this is also the worldwide expenditure on every 
good. Hence, if a firm charges a mark-up m, then its profits are Yt (1 − (1/m)), and 
total worldwide profits are
    Yt  ∫ 
1   
∞
   (1 − (1/m))    dh(m) = κYt.
Since country i captures the worldwide market for a share πit = Tit cit
−θ/Φt of goods, 
its total income is πit Yt, and its total profits are a share κ of that.
Letting dit be the probability of a random idea from country i having a market at 
time t, then the expected profits of a random idea from country i are κditYt. Thus, 
the expected discounted value of a random idea from country i at time t is given by
    Vit = κ   ∫ 
t   
∞
   e
−ρ(s−t)  (pt/ps)  disYs ds,
where  ρ  is  the  discount  rate  in  consumers’  intertemporal  utility  function,
ut  =    ∫0   
∞
   e
−ρ(s−t)  us ds, and where pt is the price index in (13).
21
Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that dit = πit/Tit.
22 To understand this result, recall 
that πit is the share of worldwide spending devoted to purchases from country i and 
also the probability that country i is the least-cost producer for a particular good. For 
an idea in country i to have a market it must be the best idea in country i, and it must 
beat the competition from all other countries. The probability that a random idea is 
the best idea in country i is simply 1/Tit, whereas the probability that the idea beats 
the foreign competition is πit.
A. short-Run Analysis
At any point in time both Lit and Tit are fixed, just as in the static model. Thus, the 
only difference between the full dynamic model and the static model of the previ-
ous section regarding the short-run implications of offshoring is the market struc-
ture. In the static model there is perfect competition, whereas in the dynamic model 
  technologies are owned by firms that engage in Bertrand competition. It turns out, 
20 To see this, recall from footnote 14 that the distribution of prices is gt(p) =   e   
−  Φ  t     p   
−θ    . Thus, the probabil-
ity that an entrepreneur with an idea of quality q in country i can charge a mark-up at least as high as m is 
1 − gt(mwi/q). Hence, the probability that an idea of unknown quality from country i can charge a mark-up of at 
least m is dit(m) =   ∫1   
∞
   [1 − gt(mwi/q)]   dh(q) ≈ (mwi)
−θ/Φt , where the approximation is arbitrarily accurate as the 
T    s get large (see Eaton and Kortum 2001, footnote 9). Conditional on selling at all, the distribution of the mark-up 
is then Pr [M ≤ m | M ≥ 1] = [dit  (1) − dit  (m)]/dit(1) = h(m). This is independent of source and time. Hence, this is 
also the distribution of the mark-up across all firms in the world.
21 The linearity assumption for intertemporal preferences is made to simplify the analysis. The short-run and 
steady-state results are clearly independent of this assumption. As to the transition dynamics in subsection IIC, 
the same results would obtain under a more general specification of intertemporal preferences as long as countries 
1 and 2 were able to access international capital markets. See footnote 30.
22 Formally, note from footnote 20 that the probability that an idea of unknown quality from country i is 
competitive (i.e., m ≥ 1) is simply dit = dit(1) = wit
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however, that the existence of mark-ups and profits under Bertrand competition 
has no effect on any of the comparative statics results derived under perfect com-
petition. This is because, as explained above, the profit share is common across 
countries.
To see this formally, note that trade balance now requires that exports of goods 
and offshoring services plus domestic sales be equal to wages plus imports of off-
shoring services plus profits. Since the value of exports and domestic sales of goods 
is πitYt, and profits are a share κ of this value, then we can equivalently state that 
trade balance requires (1 − κ)πitYt plus exports of offshoring services to equal wages 
paid to domestic and foreign workers (through offshoring). Thus, the trade balance 
conditions in the static model in equations (3), (6), and (7) are simply adjusted by 
multiplying Yt by 1 − κ. All the results for wages in (4), (8), and (10) are not affected, 
and the comparative statics results of the previous section remain valid.
B. steady state Analysis
In steady state, rit ≡ Rit/  L  it   
f   will be constant, so the growth rate of the stock of 
ideas Tit will be    ˙     
  T  it/Tit = gL, and its level will be
(16)    Tit = (ϕiri/gL)  L  it   
f  .
The choice of country n’s labor as the numeraire implies that steady-state wages 
will be constant, wit = wi, so, from (13), we can see that pt falls at a rate equal to θgL, 
so ps = pt e
−(gL /θ)(s−t). In steady state, πit is also constant. Moreover, equality between 
sales and expenditures, or trade balance, entails πiYs = Yis. These results imply that
(17)    Vit = κ   ∫ 
t   
∞
     e   
−(ρ−gL /θ)(s−t)    (Yis/Tis)  ds.
Consider country 1. Total expenditures are equal to wages paid, the cost of off-
shoring, and profits,
(18)    Y1t = w1L1t + w2αL1t + κY1t.
Using L1t = (1 − r1)  L  1t   
f
    , and solving for Y1t in (18), plugging the resulting expression 
for Y1t into (17), using (16), and assuming θρ > gL yields
(19)    V1 = w1c1 − r1 + α(1 − r1)   
w2  ___  w1   d a   
gL  ____  ϕ1r1
   b     1  ______ 
θρ − gL
    .
Turning to country 2, we have
(20)    Y2t = w2L  2t −w2α(1 − r1)φ  L   2t   
f
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where φ ≡   L  1t   
f
   /  L  2t   
f
   . A similar procedure yields
(21)    V2 = w2[1 − r2 − α(1 − r1)φ] a   
gL  ____  ϕ2r2
   b     1  ______ 
θρ − gL
    .
For all the rest of countries (i ≠ 1, 2), the corresponding expected value of an idea 
can be derived from the previous results by simply plugging in α = 0, hence
(22)    Vi = wi(1 − ri) a   
gL  ___  ϕi ri
   b     1  ______ 
θρ − gL
     .
In equilibrium, the expected payoff to research must be equal to the wage in every 
country. This entails ϕiVi = wi. For countries i ≠ 1, 2 this can be solved to yield
(23)    ri = r ≡ gL /θρ.
This implies that differences in ϕi do not affect the proportion of workers engaged 
in research.
23 For countries 1 and 2 the equilibrium conditions are (after some 
simplification)
(24)    r1/r = 1 + α(1 − r1)w2/w1
and
(25)    r2/r = 1 − α(1 − r1)φ.
Given the wage ratio w2/w1, these two equations determine the research intensities 
in countries 1 and 2.
Using (16) and Lit = (1 − ri )  L  it   
f   yields
(26)       
Tis  ___  Lis
    =    
ϕi ri  ________ 
gL(1 − ri)
     .
Thus, from (4) and (23), we see that for i ≠ 1, 2 the steady-state equilibrium wage is
(27)    wi = (ϕi/ϕn)
κ.
This is the same as in Eaton and Kortum (2001) and implies that wages differ only 
because of differences in research productivity ϕi. Notice that with no offshoring 
(i.e., α = 0 ) wages in countries 1 and 2 are also given by (27). Thus, the condition 
that w1 > w2 in steady state with no offshoring is that ϕ1 > ϕ2, which I assume 
23 Also note that r does not depend on country size or openness. This is because although larger markets lead 
to higher profits for successful innovators, stronger competition reduces the probability of being successful, and 
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henceforth. (This is the long-run counterpart to the condition η > 1 in the previous 
section.)
I now turn to the determination of steady-state wages in countries 1 and 2, when 
α > 0. As long as the resource constraint α(1 − r1 )  L   1t   
f
    ≤   L   2t   
f
    is satisfied, steady-
stage wages in countries 1 and 2 are determined by equations (8), (9), (10), and (11) 
together with Lit = (1 − ri)  L  it   
f   and equations (24) and (25).
24 Consider first the deter-
mination of w2. From (8), we can get
  w2 =   a   
ϕ2 r2  _________   
ϕn r/(1 − r)
          1  _______________   
1 − r2 − α(1 − r1 )φ
    b   
κ
  .
Using (25), then
(28)    w2 = (ϕ2/ϕn)
κ
which is the same as in the case of no offshoring. The reason for this result is that the 
decline in    ˜   
  L   2 generated by increased offshoring in the static model is now exactly 
compensated by a decline in T2 caused by a decline in r2 (see below).
Turning to w1, recall from (10) that ((1 − β)w1 + βw2) = (Tns/Lns)
−κ(T1s/   ˜   
  L   1s)
κ. 
With endogenous research the ratio T1s/   ˜   
  L   1s now depends on research efforts as well 
as the extent of offshoring. In fact, from (24), (26), and (11) we get
    T1s/   ˜   
  L   1s = a   
Tns/Lns  ______ 
ϕn
    b a   
ϕ1  ___  w1   b((1 − β)w1 + βw2 ).
The equilibrium steady-state wage in country 1 is then determined by
(29)    (1 − β)w1 + βw2 =   a   
ϕ1/ϕn  _____  w1    b   
κ
  ((1 − β)w1 + βw2 )
κ.
The Lhs is the unit cost of the common input, whereas the Rhs is proportional to 
(T1s/   ˜   
  L   1s)
κ and captures the impact of offshoring and research on country 1’s TOT. It 
is easy to show that, given our assumption that ϕ1 > ϕ2, the level of w1 determined 
by equation (29) is higher than w2.
25, 26 But this implies that offshoring lowers the 
unit cost of the common input (i.e., Lhs is increasing in β). This represents the 
productivity effect discussed above. Turning to the Rhs, note that an increase in β 
decreases this term, a reflection of the negative TOT effect discussed above. Which 
24 For this steady-state analysis, it is no longer necessary to worry about the possibility of factor price equal-
ization and the outsourcing constraint becoming nonbinding. The reason is that, as will be shown below, w2(α) is 
constant, whereas w1(α) is increasing. Thus, since w1(0) > w2(0) by assumption, then w2(α) > w1(α) for all α > 0.
25 To see this, note that this is equivalent to saying that the Lhs of (29) is lower than the Rhs of this same 
equation if w1 were equal to w2, or   w  2   
1−κ   < (ϕ1/w2ϕn)
κ, but this is equivalent to ϕ2 < ϕ1.
26 As I mentioned in footnote 19, I assume that there is no international trade in ideas. It is easy to see from 
(27) and κ < 1 that if ϕj > ϕi then Vj < Vi, which implies that innovators in j would want to sell their ideas to i. 
Since w1 and therefore V1 is increasing in β, this implies that if β is low,  then V1 < V2, so innovators in 1 would 
want to export ideas to 2, whereas, for high enough β ,we would have V1 > V2, so innovators in 2 would want to 
export ideas to 1. Exploring the full implications of this kind of trade is left for future research.VoL. 2 no. 2  247 RodRíguEz-cLARE: offshoRIng In A RIcARdIAn WoRLd
effect dominates? Since κ < 1, then the productivity effect always dominates, so w1 
is increasing in β.
27, 28
So far, I have ignored the resource constraint in country 2 that the amount of labor 
used for exporting services to country 1 must be lower than its total labor force, 
namely α(1 − r1)  L   1t   
f
    ≤   L   2t   
f
   . In fact, it can be shown from the results above that if 
r > ϕ1/((ϕ1 + ϕ2)/φ), then the resource constraint is satisfied for all α. Otherwise, 
there exists a level of α,    ˆ     α  , such that the resource constraint is binding for α >    ˆ     α  . 
In this case the equilibrium entails wage equalization, with all workers in country 2 
employed in offshoring operations for country 1.
Again, the previous results relate to wages in countries 1 and 2 relative to some 
third country n. But it can be shown that the price index p will decline with offshor-
ing, as the efficiency gains in the static model are only expanded in this dynamic 
model as offshoring allows a reallocation of labor toward the activity in which they 
have comparative advantage (research in country 1 and production in country 2). 
The following proposition summarizes these results.
PROPOSITION 5: As long as the resource constraint in country 2 is nonbinding, an 
increase in α increases the wage in country 1, whereas the wage in country 2 is not 
affected. The real wages wi/p increase in all countries.
What happens to r1 and r2 as α increases? Equation (24) implies
(30)    r1  L   1t   
f
    = r [  L   1t   
f
    + α(1 − r1)  L   1t   
f
    w2 /w1].
The term α(1 − r1)  L   1t   
f
    w2 /w1 is the number of workers indirectly hired by country 1 
from country 2 through offshoring, adjusting for the wage ratio. Thus, this equation says 
that the number of people doing research in country 1 is a proportion r of the total labor 
force in country 1 including the workers indirectly working in country 1 through off-
shoring (adjusting for wages). Thus, r1 is necessarily higher with offshoring than with-
out offshoring. Moreover, it can be shown that α(1 − r1)w2 /w1 is increasing in α, so it is 
also the case that as offshoring increases the research intensity r1 in country 1 increases.
Turning to country 2, rearranging equation (25), we get
    r2   L   2t   
f
    = r (  L   2t   
f
    − α(1 − r1)  L   1t   
f
    ).
Analogously to the result for country 1, this expression says that the number of people 
doing research in country 2 is a proportion r of its total labor force, excluding the work-
ers producing services for export through offshoring operations. This implies that r2 < 
r as long as α > 0. More generally, it can be shown that r2 is decreasing in α. Formally,
27 Formally, from (29), we get [(1 − β)w1 + βw2]
1−κ = ([ϕ1/ϕn]/w1)
κ. The LHS is increasing in w1 while the 
RHS is decreasing, and, since w1 > w2, then an increase in β implies a decline in the LHS, and an increase in the 
equilibrium w1.
28 A natural question is whether country 1 would also want to offshore research to country 2. This would 
require w1/ϕ1 > w2/ϕ2. But it can be shown, (28) and (29), that this is never satisfied for any β ∈ [0, 1].248  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
PROPOSITION  6:  The  research  intensity  r1  in  country  1  increases  while  the 
research intensity r2 in country 2 decreases as α increases.
C. Transition dynamics
Imagine an unexpected increase in fragmentation at time t0. We know from the 
previous section that if the increase in α is large enough, it would lead to a decline 
in the real wage in country 1 at time t0. As time goes by, however, workers in coun-
try 1 would switch from production to research, increasing T1t /L1t and improving 
country 1’s TOT. In the new steady state, the real wage in country 1 would be higher 
than it was before the increase in α. There are then two opposite effects of a large 
(and unexpected) increase in fragmentation: a negative short-run effect and a posi-
tive long-run effect. What is the net effect for utility at time t = 0?
To answer this question, I analyze the transition dynamics after a positive and 
unexpected shock to α. I restrict the analysis to the limiting case in which the region 
composed of countries 1 and 2 is vanishingly small. This assumption implies that 
the rest of the world (i.e., countries i ≠ 1, 2) is not affected by anything that happens 
in countries 1 and 2, and that pt continues to fall at rate gL/θ even after a shock to 
α. The working paper version of this paper contains the formal analysis. Here, I just 
describe the results informally.
Recall that wages w1t and w2t are determined by the ratios T1t /   ˜   
  L   1t and T2t /   ˜   
  L   2t (see
equations (8)–(11)), where    ˜   
  L   1t = (1 + α)(1 − r1t)  L   1t   
f
    and    ˜   
  L    2t = (1 − r2t)  L   2t   
f
    −
α (1 − r1t )  L   1t   
f
   . One can think of these ratios as a function of α together with the 
ratios x1t ≡ T1t /  L   1t   
f
    and x2t ≡ T2t /  L   2t   
f
   , and the research shares r1t and r2t. The positive 
shock to α throws the system out of steady state, with a low initial value of x1t and 
a high initial value of x2t (relative to their new steady state levels). Assuming that 
the exit rates υp and υR are sufficiently large and that υR is large relative to υp, the 
equilibrium adjustment after an unexpected increase in α has three stages. In the 
first stage ϕ1V1t > w1t and ϕ2V2t < w2t, so there is maximal entry into research in 
country 1 and maximal exit from research in country 2. This stage ends when w2t 
reaches its steady state, w2.
29 In the second stage, ϕ1V1t > w1t and ϕ2V2t = w2t = w2, 
so maximal entry into research continues in country 1 while the constraint on exit 
from research in country 2 is no longer binding. This stage ends when w1t reaches its 
steady state, w1. The third stage entails ϕiVit = wit = wi for i = 1, 2, so that wages in 
countries 1 and 2 are at their steady state values, and r1t and r2t adjust in response to 
the continued movement of x1t and x2t toward their steady-state values. Under these 
conditions, it is clear that if υp and υR are very high, then the first two stages of the 
adjustment process will be very short, and the adjustment will entail wages being at 
their new steady-state values most of the time. Since an increase in α brings about 
an increase in the steady-state wage of country 1, then this country must benefit 
from such a shock even if it experiences some losses in the short run. Country 2 
also   experiences a positive welfare effect, because wages are momentarily higher 
29 This necessarily happens before w1t reaches its steady state thanks to the assumption that υR is large rela-
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there after the shock, although they rapidly converge to the same level as before the 
shock.
30
This analysis has focused on the effects of an unexpected shock in fragmenta-
tion. If the shock is anticipated, then the previous analysis suggests that the effects 
should be even more positive for country 1, as it can start reallocating its labor 
from production to research even before the shock and, in that way, lessen the TOT 
deterioration. The opposite occurs for country 2, where the temporary increase in 
its TOT may vanish if the shock is anticipated. Although there are no clear statistics 
that one could use to measure fragmentation, it is reasonable to assume that it is a 
gradual and somewhat anticipated process rather than a sudden shock. In this case, 
the analysis suggests that as long as reallocation between production and research 
is not too sluggish, the net effect should be positive for rich countries and small (but 
positive) for poor countries.
III.  Offshoring and Immigration
This kind of analysis can also be used to shed light on the effects of migration, 
which in turn may allow us to gain some intuition about the effects of offshoring just 
described.
31 Consider again countries 1 and 2, with w1 > w2 thanks to η > 1 and no 
offshoring, and imagine that a restricted share ι of people from country 2 can cost-
lessly migrate to country 1. As ι increases, there is a short-run (with constant T’s) 
decline in η, which leads to a decline in w1 and an increase in w2. This captures the 
idea put forth by Davis and Weinstein (2002) that immigration leads to losses to the 
host country due to a deterioration of its TOT.
But, again, this is only in the short run. In the Eaton and Kortum (2001) model 
with endogenous technology levels, immigration leads to an expansion of research 
in country 1 and a contraction of research in country 2 in such a way that (in steady 
state) T1/L1 and T2 /L 2 remain constant because Ti/Li = ϕi r/(1 − r)gL doesn’t depend 
on   L   i   
f  . Wages w1 and w2 are not affected, and the only effect is a decline in prices 
thanks to the increased efficiency generated by migration toward countries with 
higher research productivities (i.e., the long-run world efficiency effect). Thus, in the 
long run all countries gain equally, and the main beneficiaries of migration are the 
migrants themselves, who experience an increase in wages from w2 to w1.
32
Let’s compare these results of migration with those of offshoring in the long run. 
As shown in Section IIC, in steady state offshoring does not affect wages in country 
2, but wages in country 1 experience an increase. Thus, focusing on the long-run 
implications, offshoring is better for country 1 than immigration. The reason for 
this is that with migration, the receiving country ends up paying the high country 1 
30 These results are valid under the assumption that intertemporal preferences are linear. When the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is low and there are no international capital flows, my conjecture is that even with 
perfect mobility of people between research and the production sector, a large unexepected increase in fragmen-
tation would decrease utility, as people would not be willing to decrease their consumption to allow for a large 
increase in research efforts to accelerate the transition.
31 Baldwin and Robert-Nicaud (2007) relate the effects of offshoring to what they call “shadow migration.”
32 The result that the effect of immigration on wages is more beneficial in the long run than in the short run can 
also be obtained in the Hecksher-Ohlin model, as well as in models that allow for capital accumulation (see Paul 
Klein and Gustavo J. Ventura 2007, and Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri 2006).250  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
wage to immigrants, whereas with offshoring, country 1 firms pay the low country 2 
wage to workers who remain in country 2. Thus, whereas with migration, the main 
beneficiaries are the migrants, with offshoring, the main beneficiaries are workers 
in country 1, whose wage can now increase because of the efficiency gains from 
offshoring.
33
IV.  An Extension
I have assumed thus far that increasing offshoring is made possible by the raising 
capability to fragment the production process, and thereby arrange to have more inter-
mediate services performed abroad. Alternatively, as in Kohler (2004) and Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), the expansion of offshoring could be seen as the conse-
quence of a decline in the cost of importing these services. In fact, the model presented 
above could be interpreted in this light by assuming that a share β of services can be 
offshored at no cost, whereas the rest entail an infinite cost of offshoring. A question 
is whether the results derived under this set-up generalize to other ways of modeling 
such costs. In this section, I present an extension of the model to explore this question, 
and then I extend the analysis to offshoring among three countries.
I assume that importing labor service k entails an iceberg cost ζ(k) ≥ 1. The 
cost  of  labor  service  k  offshored  to  country  2  is  then  ζ(k)w2.  Country  1  will 
procure service k from country 2 if ζ(k)w2 < w1 and may do so if ζ(k)w2 = w1. 
Following the stochastic approach of Eaton and Kortum (2002), I assume that ζ(k) 
(for k ∈ [0,1] ) is independently drawn from an exponential distribution with param-
eter λ and a mass point at 1. Formally, for any k and    ˆ   
  ζ   ≥ 1 we have Pr(ζ ≤     ˆ   
  ζ    ) 
= f(   ˆ   
  ζ  , λ) ≡ 1 − exp(−  λ    ˆ   
  ζ    ), where λ > 0. Note that a higher λ implies lower average 
offshoring costs, and that as λ → 0, then offshoring necessarily goes to zero. This 
stochastic approach will be particularly useful when I extend the analysis to more 
than two countries.
The goal is to understand the short-run and long-run effects of an increase in λ. 
Consider first the short run. Analogously to the results of Section I, when λ is suf-
ficiently high there is full offshoring, with wages in both country 1 and 2 equal to 
wm = δ(Tm/Lm)
κ (recall that Tm = T1 + T2 and Lm = L1 + L 2). The critical value for 
λ, λm, is implicitly defined by f(1, λm) =  
__
  β    , where  
__
  β     =  
__
  α    /(1 +  
__
  α    ) ( 
__
  α     was defined 
in Section I). In other words, λ needs to be high enough that the share of services for 
which there are no transportation costs (ζ(k) = 1 ) is at least as high as the share of 
services that must be offshored for there to be full offshoring ( 
__
  β    ). It is clear that the 
wage under full offshoring is higher than the wage that would prevail under no off-
shoring in country 2, but lower than the corresponding wage in country 1. Formally, 
letting wi(0) = limλ→0wi(λ), we have w1(0) > wm > w2(0). This result clearly also 
extends to real wages, so we can continue to say that the rich (poor) country is worse 
(better) off under full offshoring than with no fragmentation.
If  λ  <  λm,  the  equilibrium  entails  w1  >  w2.  I  now  characterize  this  equi-
librium.  Let  c1(k)  ≡  min{w1, ζ(k)w2 }  represent  the  cost  of  service  k  for 
33 The point that offshoring leads to larger gains than migration because of the difference in the wage paid to 
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country  1.  (Since  all  services  are  homogenous,  from  now  on  I  supress  the 
index  k.)  The  cost  c1  can  never  be  lower  than  w2  and  is  lower  than  some     ˆ   
  c   1
for    ˆ   
  c   1 ∈ [w2, w1[ if ζw2 <    ˆ   
  c   1. This implies that for    ˆ   
  c   1 ∈ [w2, w1 [, Pr(c1 ≤    ˆ   
  c   1) 
= Pr (ζw2 ≤    ˆ   
  c   1) = f(   ˆ   
  c   1/w2, λ) = f(   ˆ   
  c   1, λ/w2), so the distribution of the variable c1 
is given by
       0   if    ˆ   
  c   1 < w2 , 
  Pr(c1 ≤    ˆ   
  c   1)  = • f(   ˆ   
  c   1, λ/w2)     if    ˆ   
  c   1 ∈ [w2,w1[.
      1   if    ˆ   
  c   1 ≥ w1
The unit cost of the common input in country 1 is simply the expectation of c1 for 
this distribution. I will use c1(w) to denote this unit cost as a function of wages w 
≡ (w 1,w2). This is given by
    c1(w) = w2 f(1, λ) +  ∫  w2   
w1
   x df   (x, λ/w2)   + w1(1 − f(w1, λ/w2)).
On the other hand, the unit cost of the common input in country 2 is simply w2. 
Also, note that if w1 > w2,  then the share of services offshored to country 2 is s(w) 
= f(w1, λ/w2). Thus, following the same analysis as in Section I, the equilibrium 
conditions for λ < λm are c1(w) = δ(T1/   ˜   
  L   1 )
κ and w2 = δ(T2 /   ˜   
  L   2 )
κ (as in equations 
(10) and (8)),  but with
       ˜   
  L   1 = L1/(1 − s(w))
and
       ˜   
  L   2 = L 2 − Γ(w)s(w)L1/(1 − s(w)), 
where Γ(w) is the average transportation cost ζ associated with the offshored ser-
vices and is given by
    Γ(w)  ≡       
f(1, λ) + (1/w2)   ∫w2   
w1      x df (x, λ/w2)
        ________________________   
s(w)
     .
Note that in these definitions of    ˜   
  L   1 and    ˜   
  L   2, the term s(w) substitutes for β in equa-
tions (11) and (9).
As shown in the Web Appendix, the sign of the partial derivative of w1, with 
respect to λ, converges to (w1/w2)
2(1 − 2κ) − 1 as λ → 0. This implies that, since 
κ < 1/2 (because θ > 1), the curve w1(λ) will be upward sloping for low λ if 
w1(0)/w2(0) = η
κ is sufficiently high. This is similar to the result for w1(α) in 
Proposition 2. I cannot analytically characterize the behavior of w1(λ) in the whole 
interval [0, λm], but the finding that it behaves like w1(α) at both extremes suggests 
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decreasing if η is low. All numerical simulations that I have performed are consistent 
with this conjecture.
Turning to the long-run equilibrium, the result that w2 is fixed at (ϕ2/ϕn)
κ remains 
valid: offshoring costs only affect the quantity of labor used in country 2 to export 
services to country 1, but the steady-state wage in country 2 is unaffected by this. As 
for country 1, the wage is determined as in (29), but with c1(w) instead of (1 − β)w1
+ βw2, hence
    c1(w)
1−κ =   a   
ϕ1/ϕn  _____  w1    b   
κ
  .
Simple derivation (see the Web Appendix) reveals that the curve c1(w) decreases 
with λ, hence, the steady state w1 is increasing with λ. This implies that, similar 
to the results in Section II, in the long run, the rich country gains from a decline 
in the cost of offshoring, whereas the poor country gains, but only from the world 
efficiency effect.
Finally, I extend the model to allow for offshoring among countries 1, 2, and 3, 
where country 1 is the rich country, and country 2 is the poor country. Formally, 
I assume that T1/L 1 > T3/L 3 > T2/L 2 and ϕ1 > ϕ3 > ϕ2. The (iceberg) costs of 
offshoring service k to country i = 1, 2, 3 are ζi (k), which are independently drawn 
from the same distribution, assumed to be exponential with a mass point at 1 and 
parameter λ. The Web Appendix contains the full characterization of equilibrium in 
the short run and the long run for this case. Here, I present a short discussion and the 
results of a numerical simulation.
Just as in the two country case, there is full offshoring among the three countries 
if λ is higher than some critical level. Under full offshoring, w1(0) > wm > w2(0).
34 
The middle-income country is better off under full offshoring than with no offshor-
ing if Tm/Lm > T3/L3.
To gain some additional understanding about the behavior of wages in relation to 
λ, I simulated the short-run equilibrium for θ = 8 (the central value of θ in Eaton 
and Kortum 2002) with L1 = L  2 = L3 and T1 = 1, T2 = 0.04, and T = 0.2. Figure 
1 shows the resulting wages as λ goes from 0 to the value of λ under which there 
is full offshoring. As in Section I, w2 is always increasing while w1 behaves like an 
inverted U. (This last result no longer holds when T1/L1 is close to T2/L  2, in which 
case w1 is decreasing in λ.)
Turning to the long-run analysis, it is easy to show that the steady-state wage in 
country 2 is constant, whereas the steady-state wage in country 3 is increasing in λ. 
The reasoning for this result regarding country 3 exactly the same as for the result 
that the steady-state wage in country 1 is increasing in λ in the two-country case. As 
to the wage in country 1, there are two opposite effects from the increase in λ. On 
the one hand, this increases w3, which has a negative effect on country 1, but on the 
other hand, there is a direct and positive effect on w1. In the numerical simulation for 
34 As above, we have wm = δ(Tm/Lm)
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ϕ1/ϕn = 1, ϕ2/ϕn = 0.04, and ϕ3/ϕn = 0.2, illustrated in Figure 2, w1 is increasing 
in λ. This result also holds in all numerical simulations that I have performed.
V.  Conclusion
Over the last few years, there has been much discussion about the possible effects 
of increased offshoring on rich countries. Those with a favorable view have focused 
on the productivity gains associated with increasing trade in services, while the 
critics have emphasized the negative implications for rich-country wages of what 
some have called “the death of distance” (Frances Cairncross 1997). In this paper, 
I have presented a model that captures both of these effects. A main result is that a 
large and unexpected increase in fragmentation necessarily harms the rich country 
and benefits the poor country in the short run. But this also triggers a reallocation 
of resources toward research in the rich country and toward production in the poor 
country. Such reallocations weaken the TOT effects of offshoring and imply that the 
long-run effect of increased fragmentation is always positive for the rich country. In 
contrast, the poor country derives no direct gains from offshoring and benefits only 
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from the improvement in world efficiency that arises from increased trade, just as 
third countries that do not participate at all in offshoring.
The implications of offshoring for rich countries turn out to be closely related to 
those of immigration. In both cases there is a short-run decline in the TOT and real-
location of resources from production to research that weakens this effect in the long 
run. But there is a key difference. Whereas workers that export services through off-
shoring are paid the wages prevailing in poor countries, migrants earn rich-country 
wages. As a result, rich countries stand to gain more from increased fragmentation 
and offshoring than from immigration.
Coming back to the effects of offshoring, the presence of opposite short- and long-
run effects implies that the net effect of increased fragmentation for intertemporal 
utility in the rich country could be positive or negative. This depends on the speed 
with which resources can be reallocated across production and research. If this is 
sufficiently fast, then the long-run effects dominate and the rich country gains from 
offshoring. More generally, if there is a gradual process of increasing fragmentation, 
the rich country gains as long as the intersectoral reallocation of resources is not too 
sluggish relative to the pace at which fragmentation is increasing.
It is clear that TOT effects play a key role in the model. At the theoretical level, 
all that is necessary for such effects to be present is that demand curves be down-
ward sloping. But are TOT effects important in practice? To answer this question, 
Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura (2002) ran a cross-country regression of the 
Figure 2. Steady-State Wages Against λ
note: This simulation uses θ = 8, ϕ1/ϕn = 1, ϕ2/ϕn = 0.04, and ϕ3/ϕn = 0.2.
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change in the TOT against growth. To focus on capital accumulation rather than 
improvements in productivity (which could improve TOT through other channels), 
they instrument growth by the catch-up or conditional convergence component of 
growth derived from a standard cross-country growth regression. They find that 
faster growth is associated with a stronger deterioration of a country’s TOT. On the 
other hand, David Hummels and Peter J. Klenow (2005) show that larger countries 
do not exhibit lower prices for their exports. This comes out of a cross-country 
regression of export prices on size, measured by total employment, while control-
ling for income levels. According to the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model, however, 
an increase in size—ceteris paribus—should lead to a declining income level as the 
country’s TOT deteriorates. When the income level is held constant in the regres-
sion, some positive force must be compensating for this negative size effect (see 
Hummels and Klenow 2005, footnote 4). The possibility suggested by Hummels and 
Klenow (2005) is that larger countries export a larger variety of goods. In the model 
presented in this paper, there is an expansion in the set of goods exported due to an 
improvement in the level of technology brought about by an increase in research. As 
a result, export prices are not lower for larger countries in steady state.
35
Another implication of the model is that fragmentation and increased offshor-
ing lead to an increase in productivity. It seems very reasonable to think that the 
increase in offshoring has been a conscious decision on the part of firms to lower 
costs, and that this would be reflected in an increase in productivity. Recent research 
is consistent with this expectation. Mary Amiti and Shang-Jin Wei (2006) show that 
US industries with stronger expansions in offshoring of services have experienced 
higher productivity growth; the evidence is positive but weaker for materials off-
shoring. Holger Görg, Aoife Hanley, and Eric Strobl (2008) and Alexander Hijzen, 
Tomohiko Inui, and Yasuyuki Todo (2006) find similar results for plant-level data in 
Ireland and firm-level data in Japan, respectively.
It is more difficult to find direct evidence regarding another of the implications 
of the model, namely the reallocation of labor from production to research as a 
consequence of increased offshoring. There has been an increase in the share of 
workers employed as researchers in the United States and in most rich countries, but 
this is part of a long-run trend, so it is difficult to attribute it to offshoring (see Jones 
2002). Similarly, there is an increase in the share of people employed in nonroutine 
activities (see David H. Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane 2003) and in 
nonproduction or skilled occupations (see Feenstra and Hanson 1999). This could be 
broadly interpreted as an increase in research employment, but clearly this is only 
indirectly connected to the implications of the model. More research is needed to 
establish a close and direct link between offshoring and increased research in rich 
countries.
Blinder (2007) has expressed concerns that the future increase of offshoring in 
services will generate large costs for the United States during a prolonged transition. 
One way to interpret this concern in light of the model presented here is that the 
35 Note also that, if we think of each industry as a continuum of goods over which countries differ in produc-
tivity, then the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model implies no effect of size on export prices (even in the short run). 
All the effect is absorbed by a change in the country’s share of goods exported within each industry.256  AMERIcAn EconoMIc JouRnAL: MAcRoEconoMIcs  ApRIL 2010
process of deepening fragmentation will be too fast in relation to the country’s abil-
ity to reallocate resources from production to research. Levy and Murnane (2006, 
13) express a similar concern when they say that “the demand side can change much 
more rapidly than people can change their skills.” The model suggests one way to 
prevent these transitory costs: by imposing an optimal tariff or export tax the rich 
country would eliminate the possibility that increased fragmentation and offshor-
ing harms the rich country even in the short run. Of course, such a policy presents 
many potential dangers, so a better (but more difficult) approach would be to pur-
sue policies to facilitate the reallocation of people from production to research, or 
from simple tradable tasks to the development of “new processes, new products, and 
entirely new industries” (Blinder 2007, 28). Levy and Murname (2006) discuss the 
changes in the education system that would be needed to acomplish this.
A final issue worth discussing concerns the result that fragmentation does not 
directly benefit the poor countries engaged in offshoring in the long run. This seems 
inconsistent with the impression of large gains from increasing service exports by 
some poor countries, particularly India. It could be argued that, as in the model, 
these are merely short-run gains that will dissipate in the long run, but this seems 
unlikely. One explanation for long-run gains is the existence of knowledge spill-
overs triggered by offshoring. The modeling of such spillovers and the estimation of 
their quantitative importance is certainly an important issue for future research.
36 
Alternatively, India’s current prosperity could be seen as resulting from its innova-
tive provision of services that permit firms in rich countries to fragment and off-
shore part of their production process. According to this view, the increase in β that 
causes increased offshoring in the model above is actually the result of innovations 
by Indian firms. Such firms would then capture some of the productivity gains that, 
in this paper, have been assumed to go entirely to rich countries. This too seems a 
worthwile topic for further exploration.
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